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Labs of Democracy:  
Using Regional Variation to  
Understand Fiscal Policy Issues
Owen Zidar
This dissertation uses a regional approach to assess the 
aggregate effects of cutting taxes on corporations and on tax-
payers in different income groups. Determining the optimal 
course for economic policy critically depends on the effi-
ciency and equity consequences of these policies. 
The first chapter estimates the incidence of state corpo-
rate taxes on workers, landowners, and firm owners in a 
spatial equilibrium model in which corporate taxes affect the 
location choices of both firms and workers. Heterogeneous, 
location-specific productivities and preferences determine 
the mobility of firms and workers, respectively. Owners 
of monopolistically competitive firms receive economic 
profits and may bear the incidence of corporate taxes, as 
heterogeneous productivity can make them inframarginal 
in their location choices. We derive a simple expression 
for equilibrium incidence as a function of a few estimable 
parameters. Using variation in state corporate tax rates and 
apportionment rules, we estimate the reduced-form effects 
of tax changes on firm and worker location decisions, wages, 
and rental costs. We then use minimum distance methods to 
recover the parameters that determine equilibrium incidence 
as a function of these reduced-form effects. In contrast to 
previous assumptions of infinitely mobile firms and perfectly 
immobile workers, we find that firms are only approximately 
twice as mobile as workers over a 10-year period. This fact, 
along with equilibrium impacts on the housing market, 
implies that firm owners bear roughly 40 percent of the inci-
dence, while workers and land owners bear 35 percent and 
25 percent, respectively. Finally, we derive revenue-maxi-
mizing state corporate tax rates and discuss interactions with 
other local taxes and apportionment formulae.
The second chapter investigates how tax changes for 
different income groups affect macroeconomic activity. 
Using historical tax returns from the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research’s TAXSIM, I construct a measure of who 
received (or paid for) Romer and Romer (2012) exogenous 
tax changes. I aggregate these tax changes by income group 
and state. Variation in the income distribution across U.S. 
states and federal tax changes generates variation in regional 
tax shocks that I exploit to test for heterogeneous effects. I 
find that the negative relationship between tax changes and 
growth is largely driven by tax changes for lower-income 
groups, and that the effect of tax cuts for the top 10 percent 
on employment growth is small.
The dissertation evaluates the following questions: What 
are the aggregate effects on economic activity of cutting 
taxes on corporations, and what are the aggregate effects 
on taxpayers in different income groups? A fundamental 
problem in answering these questions, however, is a dearth 
of data. Some economists have looked to the past to help 
understand the effects of these policies, but extrapolating 
from infrequent tax changes is difficult since there simply are 
not that many data points from U.S. macroeconomic history. 
As such, many resort to cross country analysis and highly 
structured models, but both approaches have significant lim-
itations; countries are different in many unobservable ways 
and structured models often produce answers that ultimately 
reflect assumptions rather than the data itself.
Recognizing these limitations, economists have increas-
ingly been using regions within the United States as labs 
of democracy to determine the effects of fiscal policies. 
Looking at the economic performance of states or cities is 
not only interesting and important in its own right, but it also 
provides much more data and enables economists to focus 
on places that got different doses of economic medicine and 
to learn about the medicine’s effects. This regional analysis 
about different types of economic medicine, whether it is 
lower corporate taxes, reduced government spending, or 
upper-income tax cuts, can help sort through competing theo-
ries and provide valuable insight for policymakers who are 
considering different policy prescriptions.
In what follows, I introduce the two parts of my dis-
sertation. The first evaluates the welfare effects of cutting 
corporate income taxes on business owners, workers, and 
landowners; the second analyzes the effects of tax cuts for 
different income groups on output and employment growth.
Chapter 1
Who Benefits from State Corporate  
Tax Cuts? A Local Labor Markets Approach  
with Heterogeneous Firms  
(with Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato)
Policymakers often use local economic development pol-
icies, such as corporate tax policy, to encourage businesses 
to locate in their jurisdictions (Story 2012). For instance, the 
governors of Kansas, Nebraska, and Louisiana have recently 
advocated for large state corporate income tax cuts Steven-
son (2013). This chapter evaluates the welfare effects of 
cutting corporate income taxes on business owners, workers, 
and landowners. We make three contributions: 1) new empir-
ical evidence of the effects of tax cuts on business location, 
2) a new framework for evaluating the welfare effects of 
corporate tax cuts, and 3) a new assessment of corporate tax 
incidence and efficiency that is useful for policymakers.
In the standard open economy model of corporate tax 
incidence, immobile workers bear the full incidence of 
corporate taxes as capital flees high-tax locations (Kotlikoff 
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and Summers 1987; Gordon and Hines 2002). As a result, the 
conventional wisdom among economists and policymakers 
is that corporate taxation in an open economy is unattractive 
on both efficiency and equity grounds; it distorts the location 
and scale of economic activity and falls on the shoulders of 
workers. The standard model, however, neither incorporates 
the location decisions of firms, which increasingly drive  
policymakers’ decisions on corporate tax policy, nor the pos-
sibility that a firm’s productivity can differ across locations. 
This chapter enhances the standard model by allowing 
the location decisions of monopolistically competitive and 
heterogeneously productive firms to determine the level 
and spatial distribution of capital, employment, and produc-
tion. Accounting for these realistic features has substantial 
implications for the incidence and efficiency of corporate 
taxation. If a firm is especially productive in a given location, 
it can be inframarginal in its location choice. That is, tax and 
factor price increases may not offset productivity advan-
tages enough to make relocation profitable. For example, 
if California were to increase corporate tax rates modestly, 
both new and existing technology firms may still find Sili-
con Valley the most profitable place in the world for them 
to locate. Thus, if firms’ productivities are heterogeneous 
across locations, the location decisions of firms will be less 
responsive to corporate tax changes, and firm owners will 
bear some of the burden of corporate taxes. Furthermore, this 
lower responsiveness decreases the efficiency cost of raising 
revenue through corporate income taxation. Assessing the 
equity and efficiency of state corporate income taxes requires 
quantifying the extent to which location-specific productivity 
limits firm mobility. 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We first present 
reduced-form evidence on the effects of taxes on business 
location. We then develop a model of spatial equilibrium 
with firm location to interpret these effects and characterize 
the welfare impacts on business owners, workers, and land-
owners. Finally, we estimate the parameters that govern this 
model and quantify these welfare effects. The variation in 
our empirical analysis comes from changes to state corporate 
tax rates and apportionment rules, which are state-specific 
rules that govern how national profits of multistate firms 
are allocated for tax purposes. We implement these state 
corporate tax system rules using matched firm-establishment 
data and construct a measure of the average tax rate that 
businesses pay in a local area. This approach not only closely 
approximates actual taxes paid by businesses, but it also pro-
vides multiple sources of identifying variation from changes 
in state tax rates, apportionment formulae, and the rate and 
rule changes of other states. 
We begin our empirical analysis by quantifying the 
responsiveness of establishments to local business tax 
changes and document the validity of this variation through a 
number of robustness checks. If every establishment com-
pares the profits that they would earn across locations (based 
on local taxes, local factor prices, and their local productiv-
ity), then counting the number of establishments in a given 
area (and measuring how these counts change following tax 
changes) will reveal information about the relative impor-
tance of taxes, factor prices, and productivities for business 
location. We find that a 1 percent cut in local business taxes 
increases the number of local establishments by 3–4 percent 
over a 10-year period. This estimate is unrelated to other 
changes in policy that would otherwise bias our results, 
including changes in per-capita government spending and 
changes in the corporate tax base such as investment tax 
credits. To rule out the possibility that business tax changes 
occur in response to abnormal economic conditions, we 
analyze the typical dynamics of establishment growth in the 
years before and after business tax cuts. We also directly 
control for a common measure of changes in local labor 
demand from Bartik (1991). Finally, we estimate the effects 
of external tax changes of other locations on local estab-
lishment growth and find symmetric effects of business tax 
changes on establishment growth. These symmetric effects 
corroborate the robustness of our reduced-form result of 
business tax changes on establishment growth.
To interpret this reduced-form effect and determine its 
welfare implications, we develop a local labor markets model 
with heterogeneously productive and monopolistically com-
petitive firms. Our model expands recent frameworks in the 
local labor markets literature (e.g., Kline and Moretti 2013) 
by incorporating modeling features popular in trade models. 
Adding these features enables us to model firms’ location and 
scale decisions, to incorporate the possibility that individual 
firms have location-specific productivities, and to derive a 
simple expression that relates these features to local labor 
demand. Developing the demand side of local labor markets is 
important because our framework allows firm owners to bear 
some of the incidence of local economic development policies 
and can be used to assess the incidence implications of pro-
ductivity shocks, as well as many other place-based policies. 
Our framework models how business owners, workers, 
and landowners benefit from a local corporate tax cut. The 
incidence on these three groups depends on the equilibrium 
impacts on profits, real wages, and housing costs, respec-
tively. A corporate tax cut affects labor, housing, and product 
markets, as well as the location and scale of economic 
activity. A tax cut mechanically reduces the tax liability and 
the cost of capital of local establishments, attracts establish-
ments, and increases local labor demand. This increase in 
labor demand leads firms to offer higher wages, encourages 
migration of workers, and increases the cost of housing. Our 
model characterizes the new spatial equilibrium following a 
business tax cut and relates the changes in wages, rents, and 
profits to features of the labor, housing, and product markets. 
We show that the incidence on wages depends on the degree 
to which establishment location decisions respond to tax 
changes, an effective labor supply elasticity that depends 
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on housing market conditions, and a macro labor demand 
elasticity that depends on location and scale decisions of 
establishments. Having determined the incidence on wages, 
the incidence on profits is straightforward; it combines the 
mechanical effects of lower corporate taxes and the impact of 
higher wages on production costs. Our model delivers simple 
expressions for the incidence calculations in terms of a few 
estimable parameters. 
In the third part of the analysis, we estimate these param-
eters, test overidentifying restrictions of the model, and find 
that they are satisfied. In particular, we minimize the distance 
between the predicted equilibrium effects of business tax 
cuts from our model and the estimated reduced-form effects 
of tax cuts on local establishment growth, as well as similar 
effects on population, wage, and rental cost growth. The 
structural parameters are precisely estimated. 
Our main finding is that, over a 10-year period, firm own-
ers bear a substantial portion of the incidence of a corporate 
tax change, while land owners and workers split the remain-
ing burden. Our estimates place approximately 40 percent of 
the burden on firm owners, 25 percent on landowners, and 35 
percent on workers; the finding that firms bear a substantial 
portion of the burden is robust across a variety of specifica-
tions and estimating assumptions. The result that firm owners 
may bear the incidence of local policies starkly contrasts 
with existing results in the corporate tax literature (e.g., 
Fullerton and Metcalf 2002) and is a novel result in the local 
labor markets literature (e.g., Moretti 2011).
In the last section of the chapter, we analyze the efficiency 
costs of state corporate income taxes and discuss the impli-
cations of our results for the revenue-maximizing tax rate. 
While business location decisions are not particularly sensi-
tive to tax changes, there are important tax interactions with 
other revenue sources and apportionment tax rules that affect 
revenue-maximizing tax rates. Business mobility is an often-
cited justification in proposals to lower states’ corporate tax 
rates. However, we find that business location distortions 
per se do not lead to a low revenue-maximizing rate. Based 
solely on the responsiveness of establishment location to tax 
changes, corporate tax revenue–maximizing rates would be 
nearly 40 percent. This rate greatly exceeds average state 
corporate tax rates, which were 7 percent on average in 2010. 
We explore how interactions with other sources of state tax 
revenue and apportionment tax rules affect this conclusion. 
We find that corporate tax cuts have large fiscal externalities 
by distorting the location of individuals. This additional con-
sideration implies substantially lower revenue-maximizing 
state corporate tax rates than the 40 percent rate based only 
on establishment mobility. Nonetheless, the revenue-maxi-
mizing tax rate also depends on state apportionment rules. 
We find that states can increase corporate tax rates if these 
increases are accompanied by other changes to states’ tax 
rules. In particular, by apportioning on the basis of sales 
activity, policymakers can decrease the importance of firms’ 
location decisions in the determination of their tax liabilities 
and thus lower the distortionary effects of corporate taxes.
Chapter 2
Tax Cuts For Whom? Heterogeneous  
Effects of Income Tax Changes on Growth  
and Employment
Changes to income tax policy in the United States have 
varied substantially in the postwar period. In the early 1980s 
and 2000s, the largest tax cuts as a share of income went to 
top-income taxpayers. In the early 1990s, top-income earners 
faced tax increases, while taxpayers with low to moderate 
incomes received tax cuts. This chapter investigates how 
the composition of these tax changes affects subsequent 
macroeconomic activity. Do tax cuts that go to high-income 
taxpayers generate more output and employment growth 
than similarly sized tax cuts for low- and moderate-income 
taxpayers? 
Answering this question requires overcoming three empir-
ical difficulties:  endogeneity, simultaneity, and observabil-
ity. First, many tax changes happen in response to current 
or expected economic conditions. Second, tax changes for 
low- and high-income taxpayers often occur at the same 
time. Third, the number of data points and tax changes in the 
postwar period is somewhat limited. 
I use two identification approaches to overcome these 
empirical difficulties: narrative and compositional. For the 
narrative approach, I examine the effects of tax changes that 
are not related to the current state of the economy according 
to the classification approach of Romer and Romer (2010). 
They use the historical record (such as congressional records, 
economic reports, and presidential speeches) to identify tax 
changes that were taken for more exogenous reasons, such 
as pursing long-run growth or deficit reduction. Doing so 
enables me to overcome the first empirical difficulty. I sup-
plement the narrative strategy with an approach that exploits 
compositional differences in income groups across states. 
This compositional approach is based on the logic of Bartik 
instruments, which are commonly used in the labor litera-
ture (Bartik 1991; Katz and Murphy 1992; Moretti 2004). 
Bartik’s idea is that a given national shock can have different 
impacts at the local level. For instance, a national demand 
shock to the auto industry will impact Detroit more than 
Denver, since employment in the auto industry comprises 
a larger share of local employment in Detroit. Applying 
this idea to the question of this chapter, observe that when 
national tax policy affects top-income taxpayers, states with 
a larger share of top-income taxpayers face bigger aggregate 
tax changes. Connecticut, whose share of top-income tax- 
payers is nearly twice as big as the typical state, is analogous 
to Detroit in the auto industry example. In short, my compo-
sitional approach compares growth in employment and out-
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put across states that face tax shocks of different sizes. Since 
these state tax shocks occur in the same year for the same 
national policy change, they provide additional identifying 
variation and help address simultaneity and observability 
issues. 
I primarily use individual tax return data to implement 
these two identification approaches. For each tax change 
that classifies as exogenous, I construct a measure of who 
received (or paid for) the tax change. The measure of the 
tax change is based on three things: 1) income and deduc-
tions in the year prior to an exogenous tax change, 2) the 
old tax schedule, and 3) the new tax schedule. For example, 
consider a taxpayer in 1992 whose income was $180,000. 
Based on her 1992 income and deductions, she would have 
paid $50,500 in taxes according to the old 1992 tax rate 
schedule and $54,000 according to the new 1993 tax rate 
schedule. My measure assigns her a $3,500 tax increase 
for 1993. I use the prior year tax data to avoid conflating 
behavioral responses and measured changes in tax liabilities. 
After calculating mechanical tax changes for each individ-
ual taxpayer, I then aggregate these tax changes for each 
taxpayer in the bottom 90 percent and top 10 percent of AGI, 
respectively. 
For the narrative approach, I relate tax changes for the 
bottom 90 percent and the top 10 percent to national output, 
employment, consumption, and investment growth. For the 
compositional approach, I look at similar relationships at the 
state level. In particular, I relate state employment growth to 
tax shocks for the bottom 90 percent and the top 10 percent, 
respectively. Looking at the impact of state tax shocks is 
motivated by the following testable insight. If tax cuts for 
high-income earners generate substantial economic activ-
ity, then states with a large share of high-income taxpayers 
should grow faster following a tax cut for high-income 
earners. 
I find that the stimulative effect of tax cuts largely results 
from tax cuts for the bottom 90 percent. A 1 percent of 
GDP tax cut for the bottom 90 percent results in roughly 3 
percentage points of GDP growth over a two-year period. 
The corresponding estimate for the top 10 percent is −0.5 
percentage points and is statistically insignificant. Aggregate 
consumption growth is stronger following tax changes for 
the bottom 90 percent. Consistent with results from individ-
ual survey data about how people spend tax rebates (Parker 
et al. 2013), durable consumption growth is especially strong 
following tax changes for the bottom 90 percent. These 
consumption results suggest that tax cuts for the bottom 90 
percent stimulate economic activity and result in employ-
ment growth. The consumption channel can help explain 
why there is little detectable relationship between tax cuts for 
the top 10 percent and employment growth in the short run. 
Investment also increases following tax cuts for the bottom 
90 percent, echoing a classic paradox of thrift result (i.e., a 
reduction in individual saving can lead to larger aggregate 
savings by increasing economic growth). The state-level 
results, which are based on a different source of identifying 
variation, are consistent with these national results. States 
with a higher share of high-income taxpayers do not grow 
materially faster following high-income tax cuts, while  more 
low- and moderate-income taxpayers grow much faster fol-
lowing their respective tax cuts. I also estimate the effects of 
tax changes across the income distribution to show that these 
findings are robust to different income groupings besides 
the bottom 90 and top 10, and that the largest impacts come 
from the lower-income groups. Overall, my results suggest 
that there are substantial effects from fiscal policy, and that 
heterogeneity is quite important.
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